I like the idea (though I might limit disclosures of spying on a country $FOO to countries with a bilateral agreement not to spy back or to be similarly transparent).
I don't think it addresses the concern of capturing haystacks before we know which needles to look for but it would certainly help with transparency. Even more importantly, it ingrains in the mind of the analysts actually using these systems within the intelligence agencies, and the FISC itself, that there is that concern for eventual public disclosure. Therefore, they should be inherently suspicious of anyone trying to avoid adding a given FISA warrant to the public disclosure list, or otherwise trying to interfere with public disclosure (such as by going around FISA).
And as I've mentioned before it would be even better if this kind of thing were built-in to the systems themselves so that an analyst or their supervisor couldn't choose to 'forget' to do it.
I don't think it addresses the concern of capturing haystacks before we know which needles to look for but it would certainly help with transparency. Even more importantly, it ingrains in the mind of the analysts actually using these systems within the intelligence agencies, and the FISC itself, that there is that concern for eventual public disclosure. Therefore, they should be inherently suspicious of anyone trying to avoid adding a given FISA warrant to the public disclosure list, or otherwise trying to interfere with public disclosure (such as by going around FISA).
And as I've mentioned before it would be even better if this kind of thing were built-in to the systems themselves so that an analyst or their supervisor couldn't choose to 'forget' to do it.