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This passphrase-for-a-chain-of-private-keys idea is a nice one, and it lends itself to a bunch of privacy-related plausible deniability scenarios.

In crypto (especially when there's money involved) it's typical to imagine attackers with lead pipes and your knees in the mix; it's nice to imagine you could 'crack' and give up your stash, except it's not really your stash, it's just a little stash.

There are a bunch of other security factors at work here, though. Consider that you need to have a computer you KNOW does not have a keylogger on it, for instance.

The loss vectors for Bitcoin historically have been

a) Client bugs b) System password attacks c) 'errors' or theft by plausibly denying operators

These actually can all be mitigated, but not well with current systems. The master generator password is a good addition to the toolkit, but it's not going to be sufficient. So, let's not forget that cool crypto is as strong as its weakest link.

I've been considering how you'd safely allow frequent $1mm+ transactions with Bitcoins recently, and my list involves an unplugged from the net computer, a faraday cage and a professional auditor from one of the big four.



I wrote a lengthier set of thoughts up at my G+ account: https://plus.google.com/112885659993091300749/posts/bD4FNxN8...




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