Stuff happens. The fact that damage to a single AOA sensor -- whether in the factory or in the field -- could cause this sort of event is strictly an engineering issue.
It is most definitely not "strictly" an engineering issue.
By that logic you can say it is a quality control, FAA or management issue (and not an engineering issue) - because the engineering problem was not caught by other systems.
Also "engineering" created the AoA disagree alert. Whoever decided to make that an optional feature should be "strictly" at fault? Maybe it is the fault of the airlines that decided not to have that feature installed?
Engineering is just one part of a complex system so why do you think engineering should be blamed 100% for failures that occurred due to the whole system?
Engineering is just one part of a complex system so why do you think engineering should be blamed 100% for failures that occurred due to the whole system?
Because that's the only way something this complicated can possibly work. Fault tolerance is optional only if failure is considered to be a valid option.
Getting back to what happened in this case: at some point, a Boeing engineer was asked to make MCAS work with input from only one AoA sensor. That person could have made all the difference by saying, "Lol no," and SPEEA would have had their back.
You should be rebutting my points. To rebut your new points:
I think failure is always acceptable engineering: a defining feature of engineering is finding compromises because we don't have infinite resources, infinite ability, or perfect materials.
> a Boeing engineer was asked to make MCAS work
That sounds like you are just making stuff up about a team of engineers. So your opinion is this is all the fault of a single engineer? Not engineering after all?
1. Add MCAS system to artificially make airplane fly as if it were a different airplane.
2. Drive MCAS with only one AOA sensor.
3. Don't tell MCAS to look for (or even think about) bad AOA data or AOA disagreements.
4. Equip airplane with two AOA sensors as usual, but make the AOA disagree warning light a "value added option" that customers have to pay extra for.
5. Don't actually bother to tell pilots that they don't have AOA disagree warning lights.
6. Don't bother to tell pilots that MCAS exists at all.
7. Don't test MCAS subsystem to see what it actually does with bad AOA data.
8. Give MCAS a ridiculous amount of control authority, operating cumulatively over repeated applications to exceed what the pilot can manually override.
Now, exactly what items on this list are the responsibility of non-union labor in a South Carolina assembly plant, or whatever other mistuned horn you're tooting? Once again, in the absence of gross engineering malpractice, a broken AOA sensor is no big deal.
