Same for me, but with an ATARI 800 XL. I had too many POKEs and PEEKs in my BASIC code. Indian customs took 30 days to release this machine in the 80s.
I absolutely love the video chip of the Ataris. The display list approach is nothing short of brilliant, allowing multiple display modes on a single frame.
To be fair, that was also possible on some other 8-bit home computers of the time, but required the CPU to get involved (with tricky timing code to write the hardware registers at the right time). The 8-bit Atari's display list coprocessor is basically the daddy of the Amiga's Copper :)
I just wish the screen had a little more contrast. Besides that, the productivity was awesome.
Later I switched to a Nokia 9210 Communicator (Nokia Series 80), basically a Psion 5 with networking and phone integration and a nice screen.
My living-the-future-moment was in the early 2000s sitting in car on the phone, then opening the phone, automatically switching to speakerphone and loading a spreadsheet to check some data. Later I emailed the sheet to a colleague and send the sheet as a fax from the phone to a customer. All from a single device.
There would still be a temperature difference for some time after entering a PIN until the keys used are fully cooled. So this method might not fully mitigate the attack.
A better solution could be to heat the keys to about the same temperature as a human's finger tips, so that no heat is being transferred while entering a PIN.
Exactly, easier and much more effective than the mitigation suggested by the scientists:
>One potential risk-reduction pathway could be to make it illegal to sell thermal cameras without some kind of enhanced security included in their software.
Maybe something loosely similar to the protection that is said to be present in very high level colour photocopier that prevents from photocopying money?
This is actually a great point I hadn't even considered. I had heard of cretins using a small grease film like a tiny layer of vasolene etc on pinpads and then after the victim uses, they would shine a light on it to see.
As other comments have pointed out, devices (mobile and desktop app) do require
2FA and there's no way around that. So I'm assuming you meant the keybase.io
website where you can log in with username and password.
Note that the functionality of the website is very limited. You can't access
any chat messages or non-public KBFS data, for example. The most power thing
you can do is resetting your account, and after that is probably using your PGP
key if you uploaded an encrypted version of your private key to Keybase. If
this worries you, you should turn on lockdown mode [0] to require a device to
access those features.
After forgetting my password a few weeks or so after first creating my account (I went a long time without ever trying out Keybase, because its value proposition AFAICT wasn't very interesting up until around a year and a half ago), I had Max reset my account. I was left with mixed feelings about this:
1. Extreme gratefulness esp. wrt the hands-on approach to "customer" support, but concern for the scalability of a process that require that level of manual involvement, and
2. Concerns with how easy it was to get keybase.io/$MYNAME disconnected and reconnected by the Keybase switchboard operators
... and I wondered why Keybase's proof system didn't play a part in authenticating me.
For example: Let's say I create a Keybase account, forget my password, and realize I'm not logged in on any device. If I need to reset an account that has N social proofs, wouldn't it be a good idea for Keybase to make me prove that I am who I say I am by adding/altering M of N proofs?
And on that note:
Given that you're rolling out third-party integration, how about building off OP's thoughts, so a Keybase user can configure their account to say, "You should be able to verify that $SERVICE implements the optional 2FA parts of the Keybase integration spec; please use $SERVICE as the 2FA provider for this account."
It does by the fact that you trust your new device on first use to be yours. You can wipe application data once you close the app if you want to go trough 2FA every launch.
Does that mean you go through an extra authentication flow to enroll the new device? Otherwise it's not 2FA, it's just telling you after the fact that someone got into your account.
Last week, I logged into Keybase from a brand new iPad without any authentication challenge from a trusted device. As far as I can tell, there is no second factor.
That's weird. Almost all the nodes on your graph are signed by your PGP key 'F155E778FA657400' or the paper key 'above sleep'. The rest were signed by other devices, or were the original node...
I second this recommendation. Since listening I have heard all manner of things compared to the 747; yoga poses, describing something large, etc, as raised on the Podcast. It truly is an icon that translates across countries.
I was a service provider during the initial days of launch and for two years afterwards. Loved the people. They were driven to ship good looking products. That was their downfall. At Nest they were (at least then) focused on how things looked. Nobody cared about how it worked, or how the product should be supported after shipping. Anyways, no regrets.
I met some of the best engineers and designers at Nest in the initial days. Afterwards, it became a A quality hiring B and B hiring C. Left hand did not know what the right was doing. The quality went down the drain. The management was terrifyingly dictatorial, top-down. Everyone was preparing for a Tony presentation/demo. They were afraid like kids do of the cruel headmaster.
