There's tension between this law and the 14th, 5th and 1st amendments.
Due process doctrine from the 5th and 14th establish unconstitutional vagueness. A law cannot be so vague as to be impossible to comply with. This law requires websites to enforce a ban based on information they don't have access to. Without explain how they might possibly achieve that aim, it can be considered unconstitutionally vague.
The 1st amendment requires that a law restricting free speech use the least restrictive means possible to achieve it's aim. Due to the vagueness of how to comply on a technical level, the only possible way to comply would be to require global identity verification based on Utah's standards. I don't think that would pass a least restrictive means test.
I'm not convinced. I use a VPN basically always, and frequently get blocked by VPN detectors. It's not perfect - sometimes switching VPN servers/providers gets me past it, but websites can employ VPN-detection technology. Then they just block you, which is what this is all about. Force companies to start blocking VPN traffic. It'll be at the individual site level for a while, then at the ISP level in a few years.
In a single sentence you explained how trivial it is to get around the current technology, then said they can just use the same thing. It’s so simple, just make it perfect and use it?
Truly enforcing this kind of ban would require a level of control over the internet much greater than China's. They actually do ban VPN use, yet plenty of Chinese people still use them, and not due to lack of trying on the part of the enforcers. You can basically never plug all the holes without essentially shutting off the whole internet.
China spends roughly $6.6B censoring their internet every year [1]. Much of that probably goes to "guiding" public opinion as opposed to simply removing undesirable content, but factoring in purchasing power parity of labor and parts, let's assume the US would spend roughly the same amount just to enforce a VPN ban mostly effectively. That doesn't sound like a position that will win elections.
China knows about all VPNs, but doesn't ban them outside of political turmoil. When people start protesting, then they cut off all VPNs. They just don't do it during "peace time" because they don't want VPN users to find out which kinda of VPNs they can't block. They also apply different rules to foreigners and locals, because they want to give a better impression of their country.
They don't need perfect enforcement, or even good enforcement. The purpose is to make VPN use criminal. Then you have a large group of people getting away with criminal activity which you can go after on an individual case-by-case basis, depending on your level of compliance or troublemaking in other areas.
China doesn’t actually want to ban VPNs. They want a list of all possible dissidents so they can actively monitor them. “Banning” VPNs just lets them narrow down the list of people who might engage in wrong think.
Intention is very relevant to legal interpretations of "unauthorized access"; both the intentions of the owner, and the intentions of the "intruder". See for example United States v. Auernheimer. There's relatively well-established precedent that when a service tries to safeguard some information, that information is legally protected no matter how technically feeble the attempt at safeguarding it was.
It's not specifically tested in court and I sorta doubt OAI would start suing random users for attempting jailbreaks, but if they did, I wouldn't be surprised if they could win based on the most relevant precedents
> We wanted an installation of Kubernetes that was half the size in terms of memory footprint. Kubernetes is a 10 letter word stylized as k8s. So something half as big as Kubernetes would be a 5 letter word stylized as K3s. A '3' is also an '8' cut in half vertically. There is neither a long-form of K3s nor official pronunciation.
k3k is a play on k3s
but k3s is itself a play on words (k3s is supposed to be half the size of k8s, which stands for kubernetes)
I don't remember there being much of a difference between the 83 and 84. Did you care about the amount of memory or the clock speed of the processor? Or was it more of a status thing.
There are lots of ways to implement identity verification while preserving privacy. It's actually a super interesting engineering problem. Estonia has an excellent model to build on. The government can maintain a "traditional" ID system based on documents and in-person verification, and provide you with a device similar to a yubi-key or Bitcoin hardware wallet that could be used to share specific, cryptographically verifiable claims with third parties, like your age, or even just a boolean "over 18", but also your name or other information if you choose, with a way to control the access and audit which parties have verified which claims with the govt.
In Poland online banks to that. You can verify your identity for government purposes with the use of your online bank. No need for government to set up a scheme to confirm millions of people in person.
govt, banks, whatever. I don't care who administers the system as much as I care about the fact that they're highly regulated, and you have the control needed to expose as little information as necessary to confirm things about yourself to third parties (like just "over 18" for many sites, or your full identity for other things if necessary).
This is why I really wanted Capyloon to take off [1]. The idea was to build a whole mobile OS around PWAs. App Stores are just CDNs. There are no weird rules about payment processors. The ecosystem did not need to start from scratch.
Unfortunately, it just never gained the necessary momentum.
I was as well. It was very early, but not necessarily too early.
I think part of the problem is that they decided to have the flagship devices be low-end hardware, rather than high-end hardware. They were trying to ensure that development took low-end hardware into account, but they failed to consider that by the time the platform grew, high-end would become mid-range.
It's hard for me to know for sure, but to me it felt like the fact that none of the firefoxOS phones were targetted as devices developers would themselves want to use as their main phone was a big misstep in strategy.
eBay International exists and I've shipped my laptops from the US to Bolivia, Guam, Sweden, and before the war, Russia. You can definitely get a Pixel unless maybe you live in the DRC or the PRK
Due process doctrine from the 5th and 14th establish unconstitutional vagueness. A law cannot be so vague as to be impossible to comply with. This law requires websites to enforce a ban based on information they don't have access to. Without explain how they might possibly achieve that aim, it can be considered unconstitutionally vague.
The 1st amendment requires that a law restricting free speech use the least restrictive means possible to achieve it's aim. Due to the vagueness of how to comply on a technical level, the only possible way to comply would be to require global identity verification based on Utah's standards. I don't think that would pass a least restrictive means test.
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